The introduction of electronic medical records (EMRs) can expose patients to the risk of infringement of their privacy. The purpose of this study was to explore the relationship between patients' concerns about information privacy and their protective responses. A questionnaire survey conducted in a Taiwanese hospital revealed that, regarding information privacy, patients' concerns about the collection of information about themselves, the secondary use of this information and the possibility of errors in the recorded information were associated with their information privacy-protective responses, while concern for unauthorised access to their information by other staff in the medical facility was not. Medical facilities should devote every effort to alleviate patients' concerns about the invasion of their information privacy to avoid eroding the reputation of medical facilities and impeding the promotion of EMRs.
Introduction
Health information technology has become increasingly important to the healthcare industry because of its ability to lower costs, improve the effi ciency of service delivery, enhance the quality of care and increase patient satisfaction (Rothstein 2007; Sykes, Venkatesh & Rai 2011) . One example of these initiatives is the adoption of electronic medical records (EMRs) (Institute of Medicine 1997; Rothstein) . EMR systems organise and store medical records electronically (Sykes, Venkatesh & Rai 2011) and function as the central information storage facility associated with patient care (Institute of Medicine 1997) . By providing timely access to patient health information and decision support mechanisms, EMRs potentially reduce variability in the care of patients and are capable of enhancing the quality of decision making in clinical practice if properly implemented (Institute of Medicine 1997; Sykes, Venkatesh & Rai 2011; Zhou et al. 2009 ).
In spite of the potential benefi ts of EMRs it is inevitable that patients and others will raise ethical issues, including concerns about privacy, in this information age (Rothstein 2007) . Privacy has been defi ned as 'one's ability to control information about oneself' (Bélanger & Crossler 2011 : 1018 ; it is violated when people cannot control their interactions with social and physical environments (Culnan 1993) . In fact, privacy concern is not a new phenomenon; it often arises when the public perceives a threat from advances in information technology, which enable stronger capabilities for collecting, storing, and analysing personal information (Culnan 1993) . Researchers have found increasing concerns about whether individuals are capable of protecting their personal private information (van Slyke et al. 2006) , including personal health information (Institute of Medicine 1997; Rindfl eisch 1997; Rothstein 2007) .
In the context of health information, privacy refers to the ability of individuals to prevent the revelation of personal data to any other entity (Rothstein 2007) . In general, medical data are considered to be more sensitive than other types of information (Malhotra, Kim & Agarwal 2004) . Medical records contain a great deal of information about individuals, such as basic health information about height, blood pressure http://dx.doi.org/10.12826/18333575.2013.0011.Ma readings, weight readings, and other vital signs (Rindfl eisch 1997) . They may also include the most sensitive personal information, such as sexually transmitted diseases, Human Immunodefi ciency Virus (HIV) status, abortions, emotional problems, physical abuse, and genetic predispositions to diseases (Rothstein 2007) . If information such as this is not well controlled and disclosed inappropriately, individuals may be exposed to serious harm (Rindfl eisch 1997) . This situation may happen whether the medical records are paper-based or computerised (Gostin et al. 1993) . Moreover, the development of longitudinal and extensive EMRs will greatly expand the scope and volume of health information easily accessible in medical records (Rothstein 2007) . Although EMRs can decrease fragmentation and ineffi ciency of paper-based medical records, they are potentially vulnerable to misuse by both authorised and unauthorised users, resulting in a signifi cant increase in people's concerns about information privacy (Institute of Medicine 1997). More importantly, little is known about the extent of privacy violations in medical facilities (Institute of Medicine 1997). Thus, researchers and health information technology professionals must carefully address individual concerns about information privacy in respect to EMRs.
The aim of this study was to investigate the infl uence of patients' concerns about information privacy on their protective responses, specifi cally in relation to EMRs. The study is intended to assist governments, policy makers and medical facilities to formulate improved strategies to protect patients' information privacy.
Conceptual framework and research hypotheses
We used a conceptual framework that contained the important factors infl uencing patients' information privacy concerns. The theoretical framework was derived from protection motivation theory (PMT) (Rogers 1975 (Rogers , 1983 , and concern for information privacy (CFIP) (Smith, Milberg & Burke 1996) . We defi ned information privacy concern as individuals' concern for information privacy regarding medical facilities' use and protection of their personal information. Information privacy-protective responses (IPPR) refer to a set of behavioural responses of patients to their perception of information privacy concerns resulting from information practices of medical facilities. Rogers (1975 Rogers ( , 1983 ) introduced PMT to demonstrate how individuals alter their health attitudes and behaviours in response to health-risk messages (Lee, Larose & Rifon 2008) . PMT suggests that cognitive appraisal of threats can arouse protection motivation, which then focuses attention on understanding how individuals manage their perceptions of these threats and their mental coping mechanisms (Lee, Larose & Rifon 2008) . Specifi cally, when a message is perceived to be a serious threat, individuals understand that threat as suffi ciently terrifying to stimulate them to avert the threat (Youn 2009 ). Previous researchers (Lee, Larose & Rifon 2008; Youn 2005 Youn , 2009 ) have used PMT to explain risky behaviour and to generate effective messages to inhibit such behaviour. In a similar manner, the present study adopted PMT to comprehend the propensity of patients to use protection responses to avert privacy loss caused by the information handling practices of medical facilities. To the best of our knowledge, few previous studies have investigated the coping behaviours of patients when they are confronted with the potential violation of their privacy through EMRs.
Protection motivation theory

Threats to EMR privacy
In the EMR context, PMT suggests that the extent of patients' concerns about privacy triggers the use of risk-diminishing behaviours. The higher the level of individual concern about the privacy of information-handling practices in a medical facility, the more likely it is that individuals will try to employ privacy-protective behaviours (Rogers 1975 (Rogers , 1983 . Thus, the present study considered the extent of privacy concerns as protective motivation that stimulates subsequent behaviours to deal with information privacy threats.
http://dx.doi.org/10.12826/18333575.2013.0011.Ma Smith, Milberg and Burke (1996) proposed that an individual's concern for information privacy (CFIP) is a general concern about how organisations use and protect personal information. CFIP suggests that people with substantial information privacy concerns perceive that: (a) more information about them is collected than is necessary; (b) personal information is used for undisclosed purposes: (c) personal information is not suffi ciently protected from unauthorised access; and (d) the larger proportion of collected data are inaccurate (Smith, Milberg & Burke 1996; Stewart & Segars 2002) . Specifi cally, CFIP is a multidimensional construct consisting of four dimensions: collection, secondary use, unauthorised access, and errors (Smith, Milberg & Burke 1996) .
Concern for information privacy
Protective responses to violation of information privacy
Individuals who have high levels of information privacy concerns tend to hold the view that organisational mishandling of their personal information can have substantial negative health outcomes (Dinev & Hart 2006; Smith, Milberg & Burke 1996; van Slyke et al. 2006) . Applying the PMT to this proposition, individuals would take protective actions to minimise such information privacy risks. In other words, they are prone to engage in some types of information privacy-protective responses (IPPR) in response to the mishandling of their personal information by an organization (Son & Kim 2008) . For example, these individuals are apt to ask organisations to eliminate their personal information from databases (Milne, Rohm & Bahl 2004) , to share negative experiences with their relatives or close friends (Son & Kim 2008) , or to speak against organisations that pose threats to their information privacy (Smith, Milberg & Burke 1996) .
CFIP can be viewed as perceived threats to an individual's information privacy regarding EMRs that also triggers the individual's protective responses using PMT. Thus, the present study proposes the research framework outlined in Figure 1 , which we used to formulate four hypotheses. Note. a Smith, Milberg and Burke (1996) ; b Rogers (1975 Rogers ( , 1983 . 
Concern for Information
Research hypotheses
The effect of collection Individuals are often aware that a great deal of information is collected about them (e.g. personal characteristics and background), which can be considered as a troubling invasion of privacy and likely to arouse the concerns of most people (Milberg, Smith & Burke 2000; Sarathy & Robertson 2003; Smith, Milberg & Burke1996) . People are concerned about the extensive amount of personally identifi able data collected and stored in EMRs (Smith, Milberg & Burke 1996) . Stone et al. (1983) included information collection as one component of information privacy. Smith, Milberg and Burke also proposed that information collection is one of the four dimensions of people's concern for information privacy. Stewart and Segars (2002) argued that people's privacy concerns might relate to specifi c information practices, including methods of collection. The ease of collection, storage, and transmission of data over electronic networks also creates signifi cant risks to privacy (Gostin et al. 1993) . When applying PMT to the context of information privacy, it seems reasonable to expect that the collection of patients' information by medical facilities will continue to be an important source of privacy concerns among patients (Malhotra, Kim & Agarwal 2004) , which may lead to patients' protective responses. Therefore, the fi rst hypothesis postulates that:
There is a positive relationship between collection and patients' information privacy-protective responses
The effect of unauthorised access
One goal of EMRs is to increase the accessibility and sharing of medical records among authorised individuals and medical facilities (Barrows & Clayton 1996) . The integration of an individual's information from various databases makes computerised health information increasingly valuable and thus requires perfect protection from unauthorised access (Institute of Medicine 1994). Unauthorised access refers to people's concern that data about them are readily available to people not properly authorised to view or work with these data (Smith, Milberg & Burke 1996) . In the healthcare context, one third of medical professionals have indicated that information is released to unauthorised people 'somewhat often' (Barrows & Clayton 1996) . Although there is a general assumption that individuals should have a 'need to know' before they are permitted to access personal information (Milberg, Smith & Burke 2000; Smith, Milberg & Burke 1996) , there is the possibility of threats to the privacy of information held in medical facilities from insiders who may gain unauthorised access to data via technical or other means (Institute of Medicine 1997). For example, the staff of information system departments may have access to other employees' healthcare records where access is not properly controlled. The existence of information privacy rights means that someone has a duty either not to disclose information or to prevent unauthorised access to information by others (Institute of Medicine, 1994) . Even lay people are concerned about unauthorised access to their personal information (Institute of Medicine 1994). Thus, it is critical to guarantee the availability of health data for authorised users and prevent leaking of information by unauthorised users (Barrows & Clayton 1996) .
According to PMT (Rogers 1973 (Rogers , 1985 Son & Kim 2006) , the greater the concern individuals have about their perceived information privacy, the more likely it is that they will take protective measures in response to that threat. Thus, the present study hypothesises the following:
There is a positive relationship between unauthorised access and patients' information privacy-protective responses.
The effect of secondary use
Occasionally, information about individuals is collected for one purpose but used for another, secondary purpose without permission from the individuals concerned (Milberg, Smith & Burke 2000) , and concerns about privacy tend to be exacerbated when information is not restricted solely to the original purpose for which it was collected in the prime transaction (Sheehan & Hoy 2000) . Therefore, if organisations process information beyond that required by the prime transaction, people's concerns about privacy issues may increase (Nowak & Phelps 1995) . Even if the information is controlled internally within the one organisation, the use of personal information without authorisation will often evoke a negative response (Milberg, Smith & Burke 2000) . In the present study, secondary use refers to people's concern that personal health information is collected http://dx.doi.org/10.12826/18333575.2013.0011.Ma from the individual for one purpose but is used for another, secondary purpose without the individual's authorisation (Smith, Milberg & Burke 1996) .
In the context of health information, although medical records are designed to be used within healthcare settings, health information may be legitimately acquired and utilised by other organisations, since the value of such information is important and increasingly used in decision-making (Rothstein 2007) . Probable secondary users may include insurers, pharmaceutical payers, employers, and other stakeholders in the health information services industries (Rindfl eisch 1997). In fact, few comprehensive controls currently exist to ensure that anindividual's health information is utilised only for authorised purposes (Institute of Medicine 1997). Patients generally understand that, with consent, information in their medical records will be shared widely within a hospital and for insurance and reimbursement purposes. They also expect that data collected about them will be used only for the purpose of the initial collection and that such data will be shared with others only for that same purpose (Gostin et al. 1993; Institute of Medicine, 1994) . However, most people prefer to give permission prior to the use of their health information for any purpose other than medical treatment (e.g. research) (King, Brankovic & Gillard 2012) . The use of personal information for other purposes without authorisation will often arouse negative responses from individuals (Smith, Milberg & Burke 1996) .
Thus, according to PMT, the greater an individual's concerns about the secondary use of their personal health information by medical facilities, the more likely it is that the individual will try to respond with privacy protection behaviours (Rogers 1973 (Rogers , 1985 Son & Kim 2008) . Therefore, we propose the hypothesis:
There is a positive relationship between secondary use and patients' information privacy-protective responses.
The effect of errors
Within the context of this study, error refers to intended and unintended errors in the personal medical information collected about patients by medical facilities, and to concerns that individuals may have that protection against such errors occurring is insuffi cient (Smith, Milberg & Burke 1996) . People may know that information about them is being collected (Sheehan & Hoy 2000) but they may have concerns that the organisations involved are not taking adequate steps to reduce problems that contribute to errors in personal data (Milberg, Smith & Burke 2000; Smith, Milberg & Burke 1996) . Although some errors may be deliberate, most privacy-related concerns originate from accidental errors in personal data (Milberg, Smith & Burke 2000; Smith, Milberg & Burke 1996) .
Even in the healthcare industry, many medical records include errors and omissions (Rothstein 2007) . Errors in medicine are common and frequent, as they are in all areas in life (Bates et al. 2001) . Such errors occur regardless of whether personal health information is paper-based or digitised. Theoretically, electronic patient data can be assumed valid since medical information systems have undergone various quality-assurance procedures such as software testing and verifi cation (Barrows & Clayton 1996) . Nevertheless, errors in data integrity resulting from human error and/or malfunctions of healthcare information systems will continue to occur (Barrows & Clayton 1996) . While most errors have little potential for harm, some do cause injury; thus the cumulative results of error in healthcare may be enormous (Bates et al. 2001) .
According to PMT, the greater the individuals' concerns are about the potential errors in EMRs, the more likely these individuals will try to utilise privacy protection behaviours (Rogers 1973 (Rogers , 1985 Son & Kim 2008) . Based on the discussions above, we hypothesise: 
Method
Sample and data collection
To empirically validate the proposed hypotheses, patients over 18 years of age from a medical centre in southern Taiwan with a capacity of near 1,300 beds were selected. This medical centre was chosen for two main reasons: (a) the subject hospital provides nearly all necessary medical services, which attracts an average of nearly 5,000 outpatients each day; and (b) the subject hospital is equipped with a well-established EMR system that provides patients with high quality services. Prior to conducting the interviews and disseminating the questionnaires, the researchers received ethics approval from the Medical Records Department of the hospital. The Mall Intercept face-to-face interviewing method was adopted for data collection (Bush & Hair 1985) . This methodology was used due to a lower refusal rate than has been found with other data collection methodologies (Bush & Hair 1985) . Four trained interviewers recruited patients randomly at four main entrances to the medical centre from 1 January to 28 February 2012.Interviewers collected data via 5 to 10 minute face-to-face interviews with each respondent.
Measures
The questionnaire used in this study consisted of two parts. The fi rst part collected the demographic data of respondents and the second part dealt with their perceptions about information privacy concerns and corresponding information privacy-protective responses. According to Churchill's (1979) approach for generating questionnaires, the study combined scales from other relevant empirical studies to generate an initial pool of 21 items. Four of the items measured collection; four measured secondary use; three measured unauthorised access; four measured errors, and six were related to information privacy-protective responses. All 21measures used a 5-point Likert-type scale (1 for strongly disagree and 5 for strongly agree) and were translated into Chinese for data collection. Ten volunteer patients pre-tested the questions to eliminate ambiguous words and phrases. Appendix I shows the fi nal 21 items.
The CFIP scale for information privacy concern
CFIP, a multi-item scale fi rst proposed by Smith, Milberg and Burke (2000) measures the concerns individuals have with the information privacy practices of organisations. CFIP is more widely used than other scales for assessing privacy (Bélanger & Crossler 2011) . The scale has four dimensions, including collection of data, secondary use of data, unauthorised access to data, and errors in data. These four dimensions appear to provide a complete framework for information privacy concerns, and many researchers have cited their sound psychometric properties (Milburg, Smith & Burke 2000; Stewart & Segars; van Slyke et al. 2006) . The CFIP was adapted to the context of EMRs by the authors according to suggestions from a panel of experts.
Information privacy-protective responses scale
Measures relating to patients' information privacy-protective responses (IPPR) were adapted from the scale proposed by Son and Kim (2008) . The IPPR determines a set of patients' behavioural responses to their perception of information privacy threats that result from the information practices of medical facilities (Son & Kim 2008) . IPPR has six dimensions, including: patients' refusal to provide their personal information to medical facilities; fabrication of patients' personal information to medical facilities; asking for the removal of patients' personal information; negative word-of-mouth messages to their friends; complaints submitted directly to medical facilities; and complaints submitted indirectly to third-party organisations. Son and Kim (2008) empirically validated the IPPR, and reported that the scale had good reliability and validity (Son & Kim 2008) .
Data analysis methodology
We used structural equation modeling (SEM) for hypothesis testing. SEM enables researchers to answer a set of interrelated research questions in a single, systematic, and comprehensive analysis by modeling the relationships among multiple independent and dependent constructs simultaneously (Bagozzi & Yi 2012 ). The proposed model and hypotheses were empirically validated using partial least square (PLS), a componentbased SEM (Chin 1998) (Chin 1998) . Moreover, the global fi t measure GoF was used to validate the PLS model globally and was computed as 2 * R AVE (Wetzels, Odekerken-Schröder & van Oppen 2009) .
Note: AVE = average variance extracted
Results
Descriptive statistics
A total of 300 patients were invited to participate in the study, 204 of whom agreed to participate (response rate = 68%). A majority of the respondents (54.9%) were 30-59 years old, with 50.5% being male and 49.5% female. With regard to educational background, 58.8% of the respondents had an undergraduate degree, 31.4% had a master's degree, and 9.8% had completed high school. This sample was consistent with the general population for Taiwan for gender, but generally younger and better educated.
Analysis results
Previous studies suggest a two-stage process for assessing PLS model structure, including (a) the measurement model and (b) the structural model (Chin 2010; Henseler, Ringle & Sinkovics 2009 ). The measurement model articulates the relationships between the latent variables and the measured (observed) variables, whereas the structural model articulates the relationships between the exogenous and endogenous latent variables.
Measurement model
The measurement model was tested to ensure that the constructs possess suffi cient reliability and validity. Reliability is usually evaluated via individual item reliability and construct reliability. Individual item reliability was assessed by means of confi rmatory factor analysis (CFA) implemented by PLS (Gefen & Straub 2005) . All constructs are modeled as fi rst order and refl ective, because their measurement items are manifestations of these constructs and because these items co-vary (Chin 1998) . The decision to retain items was based on Henseler, Ringle and Sinkovics's (2009) recommendations with regard to the absolute standard outer loadings (>0.7), which resulted in three items being dropped, including one item (UA2) in 'Unauthorised Access', and two items (IPPR1 and IPPR2) in 'Information Privacy Protective Responses'. A second-run CFA was performed and the results indicated that all loadings were higher than 0.7. Construct reliability was tested by assessing Cronbach's α and composite reliability (CR) (Henseler, Ringle and Sinkovics 2009 ). Cronbach's α was higher than the suggested value of 0.7 for all variables tested (Henseler, Ringle & Sinkovics 2009) , while the CR of all variables was greater than 0.8, which is higher than the suggested cut-off value of 0.6 (Henseler, Ringle & Sinkovics 2009 ), indicating suffi cient reliability of the measurement (Table 1) . Criteria for assessing validity include convergent validity and discriminant validity (Henseler, Ringle & Sinkovics 2009 ). Fornell and Larcker (1981) recommend that convergent validity can be justifi ed via the average variance extracted (AVE). Results revealed that AVE ranged between 0.68 and 0.79, exceeding the cut-off value 0.5 (Fornell & Larcker 1981) , and suggesting good convergent validity (see Table 1 ). Moreover, discriminant validity can be assessed by comparing the square root of the AVE and the correlations of the construct with the other constructs in the model (Fornell & Larcker 1981) . Results indicated that none of the inter-correlations of the constructs employed in the study exceeded the square root of the AVE for the construct (see Table 1 ), indicating satisfactory discriminant validity.
Structural model
Since consensus does not exist about the sample size of bootstrapping (Andreev et al. 2009 ), bootstrapping with 1,000 re-samples (Chin 2010 ) was used to assess the path signifi cance. Test results from structural equation modeling analyses of hypotheses are summarised in Table 2 , where the standardised path coeffi cients and t-values are shown. The four hypothesised links were all supported, with the exception of Hypothesis 2 (unauthorised access IPPR). Further, the four antecedents jointly explained about 33% of variance of IPPR. As for the GoF, the geometric mean of AVE is 0.711 and R 2 is 0.334 in this study. Thus, the GoF for this study is 0.487, exceeding the cut-off value 0.36 for large effect sizes, indicating the model performs well (Wetzels et al. 2009 ).
Discussion
The effect of collection
Results for Hypothesis 1 support the proposition that a positive relationship exists between data collection and patients' information privacy protection responses; that is, patients are concerned that too much of their personally identifi able information was collected by medical facilities. Also, the collection of their personal private information may cause patients to feel uncomfortable or embarrassed. These results are consistent with conclusions reached by previous studies (Malhotra, Kim & Agarwal 2004; Smith, Milberg & Burke 1996; Stewart & Segars 2002) . To cope with this problem, Smith, Milberg and Burke (1996) further suggested that the database design for storing personal information should be parsimonious, collecting only required data. This suggests that EMRs in the hospital should collect only the minimal levels of data suffi cient for treatment. However, the individual health conditions of patients should determine the amount and type of data to be collected including data on social support, living conditions, and previous diagnoses.
The effect of unauthorised access
In testing Hypothesis 2, the results failed to support the proposition. Patients in this study had little concern about unauthorised people within the hospital setting accessing their EMRs. These results are counter-intuitive. In fact, medical personnel have been found to often abuse their record access privileges out of curiosity or for their own purposes (Rindfl eisch 1997). However, patients who attend medical facilities may have a high degree of trust in their physicians and in the interests of receiving adequate treatment they may not be overly concerned about unauthorised access to their EMRs within these medical facilities. Moreover, many individuals may not understand how authorised or unauthorised users of medical facilities access their EMRs if medical facilities do not disclose the process of access to information. Finally, since most respondents were educated, they may have had a greater level of trust in their peers and therefore less concerned about unauthorised access by hospital staff. Thus, although the results of this study failed to confi rm the relationship between unauthorised access and IPPR, medical facilities should nonetheless keep track of the activities of EMR usage by authorised and unauthorised employees.
The effect of secondary use
With regard to Hypothesis 3, results revealed a positive relationship between secondary use and patients' information privacy protective behaviours; that is, patients in this study did care about the use of the information in their EMRs when this secondary use was different from the original purpose. This result is consistent with conclusions reached by previous studies (King, Brankovic & Gillard 2012; Smith, Milberg & Burke 1996) . These researchers suggested that medical facilities should refuse to release personal data to outside entities without prior approval and consent; that is, healthcare institutions should never deliver personal health information to other individuals or organisations without the individual's consent and acknowledgement of hospital management. Currently, many potential secondary users of health information (e.g. insurers, pharmaceutical payers) exist. These users have a justifi ed need to access personal health information; however, few procedures are in place to ensure that the information is used solely for intended purposes (Rindfl eisch 1997). Medical facilities should address this situation with care when implementing EMRs.
The effect of errors
Results of Hypothesis 4 support the proposition that a positive relationship exists between errors in EMRs and patients' information privacy protective behaviours. In other words, patients care about the accuracy of information in their EMRs because they want their physicians to make medical decisions based on reliable and confi dent data (Institute of Medicine 1994). In the era of EMRs, patient information can easily be sent to other medical facilities. If the information is somewhat fallacious and not corrected in a timely manner, the impact on the patient safety may be great. This fi nding is consistent with conclusions confi rmed by Smith, Milberg and Burke (1996) . Moreover, one of the goals of information privacy is to ensure the integrity of healthcare data (Barrows & Clayton 1996) . Patients cannot possibly review and correct data about themselves (Gostin et al. 1993) ; thus, the subject hospital should protect EMRs from intended or unintended alterations to maintain data accuracy, completeness, and integrity (Barrows & Clayton 1996; Gostin et al. 1993; Institute of Medicine 1994) .
Implications and limitations
Practical implications
First, the present study, which identifi ed the central dimensions of patients' information privacy concerns about EMRs (i.e. collection, secondary use, and errors), can serve as the fi rst step on a path of proactive management towards this issue (Smith, Milberg & Burke 1996) . Moreover, the present study also found that patients took protective responses towards EMRs when their information privacy concerns were invaded. The lack of attention to these relationships in the healthcare context is problematic because of the infl uence of these relationships on the promotion of EMRs in the future. Thus, these fi ndings may assist the development of EMRs by those responsible for formulating and implementing information-privacy protection procedures in organisational and societal contexts. Additionally, legislators could use these results to guide the formulation of information-privacy protection-oriented legislation (Stone et al. 1983) .
Theoretical implications
Previous studies have emphasised the relationship between people's information privacy concerns and information privacy protective behaviours (Lee, Larose & Rifon 2008; Youn 2005 Youn , 2009 care context regarding people's information privacy concerns about EMRs. Thus, more privacy studies using a conceptual framework similar to the one used in this study should examine the crucial role that information privacy concerns have in shaping people's attitudes toward EMRs.
Limitations of the study
This study only looked at people who access EMRs without authorisation as staff at the medical facility, which might ignore other unauthorised access by individuals not associated with the medical facility. Further, the external validity of the fi ndings may be limited as the sample was collected from one hospital in Taiwan only. Consequently, inferences to other populations cannot be made safely. However, the collected sample possessed certain demographic characteristic (e.g. gender) in the same proportion as the Taiwanese population, although there were some differences in age and education, meaning that these results may be generalisable to other Taiwanese hospitals. Future research could expand on the present study's fi ndings by using a more representative sample in other geographical settings.
Conclusion
This study investigated relationships between patients' information privacy concerns and their information privacy protection responses towards EMRs, based on protective motivation theory. Results indicated that collection of information, secondary use of information and errors in data collection were primary factors in arousing patients' information privacy protective responses toward EMRs.
Governments and medical facilities should focus on these fi ndings and develop EMR privacy protection policies to reduce people's information privacy concerns. From a theoretical perspective, this study contributes to CFIP literature by further exploring the relationship between patients' information privacy concerns and their information privacy protective responses. Furthermore, this study has empirically validated the appropriateness of employing the CFIP instrument in a health care context. Additionally, because the number of medical facilities adopting EMRs has risen, studies on patients' views about information privacy have become increasingly important. This study makes a contribution to fi lling this research gap.
